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THE PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING EMISSION
"CAPS" IN CARBON TRADING PROGRAMS
WITHOUT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
INVOLVEMENT: A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF
THE CHICAGO CLIMATE EXCHANGE AND THE
NORTHEAST REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS
INITIATIVE
Tseming Yang*
Since the Kyoto Protocol of the Climate Change Convention en-
tered into force in early 2005, the parties have been busily moving
forward with their individual compliance efforts. Emission trading
has been an important tool in such efforts. In Europe, a carbon
emission market is now fully operational.'
The Bush Administration's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol has
slowed the development of carbon markets in the U.S. Nevertheless,
several private and state-sponsored programs have arisen in response
to the potential business opportunities, the desire by many to take
actions regardless of federal government recalcitrance, and the ex-
pectation that the future reality of climate change will force the U.S.
to take on carbon trading eventually. Two of the best known pro-
grams are the private carbon market formed by the Chicago Climate
Exchange and the multi-state Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI) in the northeastern U.S.
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. Research assistance was provided
by Jeff Allmon, Michael Stahler, and Lauren Hopkins. Chris Dutton and Kellee
James were also helpful in discussing some of the issues. The essay is based on a
presentation at the Fordham Envtl. Law Review, Symposium, Reducing Green-
house Gases, March 20, 2006.
1. See Council Directive 03/87, 03 O.J. (L275) 32 (EC). Several formal carbon
emission credit exchanges have been created, including the European Climate
Exchange, Climex Alliance, Nord Pool, and the European Energy Exchange.
Kevin Morrison, Carbon Emissions Exchange Launched, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct.
19, 2005, at 45. See also European Climate Exchange, http://www.europeancl
imateexchange.com.
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These efforts, as well as the European emissions market, follow
closely in the footsteps of the sulfur dioxide cap and trade scheme
created under the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments. The fed-
eral acid rain program, however, was premised on the regulatory
involvement of the federal government as the ultimate enforcer of a
program-wide emissions cap on sulfur dioxide. Without regulatory
support by the federal government, 2 can private and multi-state cap
and trade programs effectively limit or reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions? 3 This essay will examine these questions for the carbon mar-
kets of both the Chicago Climate Exchange and the New England
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.4
I. CAP AND TRADE PROGRAMS
Cap and trade emissions trading programs, like the EPA's sulfur
dioxide trading program, are among the best known market-based
instruments to control pollution. Such programs set an overall limit
on the amount of emissions that can be released by all of the pro-
gram participants. They focus on verification and tracking of emis-
2. In fact, the EPA has asserted that it lacks the legal authority to regulate
carbon dioxide emissions. Memorandum from Robert F. Fabricant, EBA General,
to Marianne L. Horinko, EPA Acting Administrator, EPA's Authority to Impose
Mandatory Controls to Address Global Climate Change Under the Clean Air Act,
(Aug. 28, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/airlinks/co2petitiongcmemo8-
28.pdf. This essay was written and edited before the political changes brought by
the 2006 Congressional elections. It is unclear how these changes will influence
the federal government's short-term stance on climate change.
3. One variation of the issue recently arose for the European carbon market in
May 2006 when the integrity of the program's overall emissions cap came into
question. During that period of time, news emerged that there had been over-
allocations of carbon allowances by various nations, resulting in more allowances
program-wide than actual emissions. The price of carbon allowances dropped by
over 50% before rebounding somewhat in mid-May. Fiona Harvey, Energy: The
Ups And Downs Of Trading: A Brief Introduction, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 30,
2006, at 9.
4. Market-based programs to regulate pollution have encountered significant
equity critiques. See, e.g. Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-
Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 289 (1998). For example, they tend to be agnostic about environ-
mental justice and other distributional equity issues. But pollution markets are
likely to remain an important environmental policy tool for the foreseeable future,
and they remain an important alternative to inaction on an important environ-
mental problem. I do not address these issues here.
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sion reductions credits, with little concern about how members use
their credits or where they end up. Credits become fungible, and
thus tradable, commodities. 5 In contrast, offset programs, for exam-
ple, match up individual emissions reductions with specific emis-
sions increases.
Under the EPA's sulfur dioxide trading program, each program
participant is allocated a certain number of emission credits that may
either be used to comply with applicable permit requirements or
traded. Since individual companies face differing compliance costs
for controlling sulfur emissions, trading effectively shifts emission
control obligations to program participants with lower compliance
costs. In turn, they are then effectively paid for these efforts by the
high compliance cost participants. Overall compliance costs are re-
duced, and the program-wide emissions cap can be achieved with
greater economic efficiency.
As the short-hand name of such programs indicates, the most im-
portant task is the proper regulation of the cap and trade of emission
credits. The second component of cap and trade, the rules governing
the assignment and trading of pollution credits, has been the subject
of much commentary and discussion by scholars and practitioners
alike. Past experience has shown, for example, that certain require-
ments, such as fungibility of allowances, transparency of the pro-
gram, and consistency of rule application, must be satisfied in order
for emissions trading to operate effectively.
6
There has been much less discussion about the first component:
the emissions cap. For the Clean Air Act's acid rain program, ongo-
ing regulatory supervision by the federal government obviates con-
cern about the issue. When a company does not have the requisite
allowances for its emissions and has "blown" the cap, the EPA can
take traditional enforcement actions to bring the company back into
line. For the pioneering carbon markets of the Chicago Climate Ex-
change and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, however, fed-
5. For a description of various approaches, see UNITED NATIONS ENV'T
PROGRAMME, AN EMERGING MARKET FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: A GUIDE TO
EMISSIONS TRADING 9-10 (2002).
6. See generally OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, TOOLS OF THE TRADE: A GUIDE TO DESIGNING AND OPERATING A CAP
AND TRADE PROGRAM FOR POLLUTION CONTROL (2003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/international/tools.pdf; ANNIE PETSONK, DANIEL
DUDEK & JOSEPH GOFFMAN, ENVTL. DEF. FUND & PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE, MARKET MECHANISMS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: AN
ANALYSIS OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS (1998).
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eral regulatory support is not likely to be forthcoming in the present
political climate.
What does this bode for the efficacy of these carbon markets?
How can one ensure that emissions do not go above the pre-specified
limit? What does a "cap" mean when there is no federal regulatory
involvement? These questions raise issues related to the monitoring
and enforcement of the underlying formal carbon emissions limits of
individual program participants.
II. THE CHICAGO CLIMATE EXCHANGE
As one alternative to a federally created carbon market, the Chi-
cago Climate Exchange (CCX) is an example of a market created
primarily by private entities. Commonly referred to as the "brain-
child" of Richard Sandor, a former economist with the Chicago
Board of Trade,7 it has received much publicity since it was created.
The CCX describes itself as a "voluntary pilot Greenhouse Gas
emission reduction and trading program for North America" 8 that is
"legally binding." 9 It seeks to:
a) demonstrate unambiguously that a cross-section of North
American private and public sector entities can reach agreement on a
voluntary commitment to reduce Greenhouse Gas emissions and
implement a market-based emission reduction program;
b) establish proof of concept by demonstrating the viability of a
multi-sector and multi-national Greenhouse Gas emission cap-and-
trade program supplemented by Project-based emission offsets. 10
The CCX began operating in 2003. Its members include not only
large Fortune 500 companies such as Ford, DuPont, International
Paper, American Electric Power, and BP America, but also smaller
entities like Green Mountain Power and Central Vermont Public
7. Trading Hot Air: A New Approach to Global Warming, THE ECONOMIST,
Oct. 17, 2002, available at http://www.economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfin?story_i
d=1392773 [hereinafter Trading Hot Air].
8. Chicago Climate Exch. Inc., Rule 1.0 Introduction, Rulebook (January
2004) (on file with author)[hereinafter CCX Rulebook].
9. Chicago Climate Exch. Inc., Overview and Benefits (2005), available at
http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/about/pdf/CCX CorpOverview_2005.pdf.
10. CCX Rulebook supra note 9, at Rule 1.1 Goals of Chicago Climate Ex-
change.
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Services, both Vermont electric utility companies." Governmental
entities participate as well, including the cities of Chicago, Berkeley,
Oakland, and Aspen. In addition to full-fledged members, the CCX
accepts participant members, which provide liquidity to the market
and offset credits, 12 and associate members, which have no or negli-
gible emissions but trade for reasons other than compliance with
emissions reduction commitments.' 3 The CCX allows non-business
entities, primarily environmental organizations, to join as associate
members. Some of them have purchased emissions allowances as a
way of retiring them in much the same way some organizations have
done in the acid rain trading program.
Even though the CCX calls itself a carbon exchange, it trades in all
of the greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol, not just car-
bon dioxide. 14  Similar to the Kyoto Protocol, all accounting for
emissions credits is done in carbon equivalents.' 5  Credits are
tracked as "Carbon Financial Instruments" (CFI), each CFI account-
ing for 100 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents.' 6 At the time
of exchange inception, the 28 original members of the CCX ac-
counted for approximately 700 million tons of carbon dioxide
equivalents annually. 17
Like other cap and trade emissions programs, the CCX seeks to
achieve environmental gains by gradually reducing program-wide
11. The initial group of participants included "some 50 companies in power
generation, forest products, manufacturing, oil and gas, and agricultural sectors."
Richard L. Sandor, Creating New Markets: The Chicago Climate Exchange, in
THE NEW PUBLIC FINANCE: RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CHALLENGES (Inge Kaul &
Pedro Conceicao eds., Oxford University Press 2006), available at
http://www.thenewpublicfmance.org. Since then, another 45 entities have joined.
Id.
12. Members of the Chicago Climate Exchange, http://www.chicagocl
imatex.com/about/members.html, (last visited June 28, 2006). See also CCX Rule-
book, supra note 8, at Rule 2.2.2 & 2.2.3. Offset credits are carbon credits gener-
ated by entities that are not CCX members, for example by carbon sequestration or
other emissions reduction activities.
13. CCX Rulebook, supra note 8, at Rule 2.2.2.
14. Id. at Rule 2. Compare CCX Rulebook supra note 8, at Rule 6.3.1 In-
cluded Emissions, and CCX Rulebook supra note 8, at 7.3 Included Gases with
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Annex A (1998), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
15. CCX Rulebook supra note 8, at Rule 1.3 Definitions ("Carbon Dioxide
Equivalent").
16. Id. at Rule 1.3 Definitions (defining "Carbon Financial Instrument").
17. Trading Hot Air, supra note 7.
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and individual members' emissions limits. The baseline used to
measure reductions is the annual emissions average from 1998 to
2001.18 In 2003, the CCX capped emissions at 1% below the emis-
sions baseline. Each subsequent year, emissions caps have been re-
duced by an additional 1% from the 2003 baseline. 9 The 2006 cap
is 4% below the 2003 baseline.
The original pilot period of the CCX was 2003-2006,2o after which
the CCX was set to expire. However, CCX members have recently
extended the operation of the pilot market period to 2010. For 2006
- 2010, emissions reductions are scheduled to progress at varying
annual levels, resulting in an overall 6% reduction from 2003 base-
line levels by 2010.21
There is an annual "true-up" period, the time of reckoning when
CCX members must account for whether emissions in the previous
year match the number of carbon allowances each member holds.22
If a member's emissions exceed its individual emissions limit, it is
given an opportunity to purchase additional allowances. However,
the rules of the CCX impose limits on the purchase of offset and
early action credits.23
How does the CCX ensure that members do not exceed their over-
all emissions cap? Since the federal government does not currently
limit greenhouse gas emissions, participants voluntarily accept the
emissions limits. There is no formal governmental role in the polic-
18. Id. at 3; CCX Rulebook supra note 8, at Rule 6.5.1 General Provisions.
19. Chicago Climate Exch., Inc., Chicago Accord 3 (2004), available at http://
www.chicagoclimatex.com/about/pdf/ChicagoAccord_050623.pdf; CCX Ruleboo-
k, supra note 8, at Rule 4.6 & table 4.1.
20. Chicago Climate Exch. Inc., supra note 19, at 2.
21. Chicago Climate Exch. Inc., Chicago Climate Exchange,
http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/about/program.html (last visited June 28, 2006)
(subsection entitled "CCX Emission Reduction Target" sets the following targets:
2007: 4.25%,2008: 4.5%,2009: 5%, 2010: 6%).
22. CCX Rulebook supra note 9, at Rule 4.7 True Up ("annual retirement...
of... [allowances] in an amount equal to that Member's or Associate Member's
owned Co2 equivalent emissions during the Compliance Year").
23. Id. at Rule 4.11.5 Use of Exchange Offsets and Exchange Early Action
Credits. On the other hand, Rule 4.8 Economic Growth Provision (EGP) also
limits the maximum emissions that are recognized for CCX purposes to 102 -
103% of the baseline emissions. In other words, "the maximum amount of net
purchases of [carbon allowances] required for Compliance is limited to 3% of each
CCX Member's or Associate Member's emission baseline during 2003, 4% ...
during 2004, 6%... during 2005 and 7% during 2006." Id. at Rule 4.8.
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ing of compliance.24 Rather, as an exempt commercial market under
the Commodities Exchange Act,25 compliance with CCX rules, con-
tained in the Rule Book, is monitored by the CCX itself and by the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). 26
This has given the widespread impression that the commitments
undertaken by CCX members are unenforceable. In a recent de-
scription, it was said that "[u]nlike Kyoto, CCX has no teeth. 27 As
a legal matter, that is incorrect.
Emissions control commitments are voluntarily undertaken by
joining the CCX. However, subsequent compliance is arguably not
voluntary at all. Because the CCX is a self-regulated, private entity,
unsupervised by the CFTC or other regulatory body, it is, in essence,
a private contractual arrangement. When entities become CCX
members, they agree "to abide by the rules of the Exchange as pro-
vided in the CCX Rulebook.",28 Violations of CCX commitments
24. Id at Rule 1.2 Regulatory Status.
25. Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(3)(2002). See also Commod-
ity Futures Trading Comm'n., Exempt Commercial Markets That Have Filed No-
tice with the CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/dea/deaecmtable.htm (last visited July
7, 2006). Exempt commercial markets are markets that utilize "electronic trading
facilities providing for the execution of principal-to-principal transactions between
eligible commercial entities in exempt commodities." Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n., Exempt Commercial Markets, http://www.cftc.gov/dea/deaxcomback
ground.htm; see also Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(3)-(5) (2002).
26. CCX Rulebook supra note 8, at Rule 1.2 Regulatory Status. NASD "as-
sists in the registration, market oversight, and compliance procedures for CCX
members." Chicago Climate Exch., Inc., supra note 9; Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, NASD and the Chicago Climate Exchange Reach Historic
Agreement (Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://www.nasd.corn/PressRoom/
NewsReleases/2002NewsReleases/NASDW_002911. See also CCX Rulebook
supra note 8, at Rule 1.3 Definitions ("Provider or Regulatory Services" to audit
emission baselines, "market oversight and compliance procedures," and prevent
"fraud and manipulation").
27. Jeff Goodell, Capital Pollution Solution?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 30,
2006, at 34.
28. Authorization/Agreement, Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) Application
for Membership 5, rev. 8/04/05 v4 (on file with author). See also CCX Rulebook
supra note 8, at Rule 2.7.1 General Provisions ("Each Registry Account Holder
shall abide by the provisions established in [the CCX] Rulebook."); Rule 2.7.2
Emissions Baselines, Monitoring, Reporting and Reduction Schedules ("Subse-
quent to each Compliance Year, each Member shall surrender any combination of
allowable Carbon Financial Instruments in an amount equal to the Member's
Owned Emissions . .. occurring during the Compliance Year."); Rule 2.7.3 Ful-
fillment of Obligations ("Each Registry Account Holder shall be fully responsible
for the timely performance of all obligations and contracts entered into through the
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would thus be enforceable as breaches of contractual obligations and
lead to corresponding forms of liability. In other words, the CCX is
as "voluntary" as any contract commitment is. CCX commitments
may be made voluntarily, but they become legally binding once as-
sumed.
What happens when a CCX member fails to limit its carbon emis-
sions as required and then refuses to purchase the requisite carbon
allowances? The rules of the CCX do not explicitly address the con-
sequences of non-compliance with emissions limits. Presumably,
the procedures governing Exchange rule violations more generally
would be triggered. 29 These provisions provide for punitive sanc-
tions, including fines and suspension of trading privileges, when any
CCX rules are violated. The ultimate sanction is termination of
CCX membership. 30  Since compliance with emissions limits and
true-up are a Rulebook requirement, these provisions provide a
mechanism for deterring or responding to non-compliance.
Because the CCX is a privately held company, much information
about its operations is not publicly available. Thus, it is not clear
whether the sanctions mechanism has ever been triggered. But given
the small size and voluntary membership, consisting of companies
that have a commitment to reducing their own greenhouse gas emis-
sions, it is probably safe to assume that the mechanism has not been
used. 31  Even if an emissions limit is missed, the true-up period
would provide ample opportunity to purchase the necessary carbon
CCX Trading Platform."); Rule 2.9 Prohibited Conduct ("No Registry Account
Holder shall: (4) violate or fail to conform to the rules of the Exchange, or the
Applicable Laws and regulations.").
29. CCX Rulebook supra note 8, at Rule 2.10 Exchange Rules Violations. See
also CCX Rulebook supra note 8, at Rule 1.3 Definition ("Compliance" is the
status of being in conformance with the provisions established in this Rulebook.
The term "in compliance" is also used to describe the status of a CCX Member or
Associate Member that has surrendered Carbon Financial Instruments to CCX in
an amount equal to its emission.).
30. CCX Rulebook supra note 8, at Rule 2.11 ("If it appears that a Registry
Account Holder... cannot demonstrate its ability to achieve compliance... the
Executive Committee may impose any restriction upon the operations of the Reg-
istry Account Holder as deemed appropriate in the circumstances. Each Registry
Account Holder failing or refusing to comply promptly with a restriction imposed
by the Chief Executive shall be subject to penalty, which may include suspension
of all privileges, or termination of membership.").
31. There has also been a suggestion that the baseline was set such that it
would provide some members with ample protection against any possibility of
exceedance. See Goodell, supra note 27.
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credits. At prices fluctuating between $1-4 per ton of carbon equiva-
lent, that would seem to be a minor inconvenience for any company
committed to enhancing or maintaining its green reputation.3 2 For
2003 and 2004, the CCX has reported the successful reduction of
program-wide carbon emissions by over 8% and over 13%, respec-
tively, below the relevant emissions reduction objectives.33
Nevertheless, it would be premature to hail the CCX's success - so
far - as a harbinger of the future viability and effectiveness of pri-
vate carbon trading programs more generally. Several issues critical
to the implementation of an environmentally effective emission trad-
ing program remain unresolved. For example, questions have been
raised about how the CCX measures credits and ensures the addi-
tionality of emissions reductions. 34 The Economic Growth Provi-
sions of the CCX Rule Book also limit the total extent to which a
CCX member's non-compliance is recognized by the Exchange.
35
Thus, the maximum C02 equivalent emissions that will be recog-
nized for the purpose of True-up by each CCX Member or Associate
Member will be 102% of that Member's or Associate Member's
Baseline Emission level during each of the years 2003 and 2004, and
103% of its Baseline during each of the years 2005 and 2006.
When combined with the CCX Emission Reduction Schedule, the
Economic Growth Provision implies that the maximum amount of
net purchases of Exchange Allowances and/or Exchange Offsets...
required for Compliance is limited to 3% of each CCX Member's
and Associate Member's emission baseline during 2003, 4% of its
baseline during 2004, 6% of its baseline during 2005 and 7% of its
baseline during 2006.36
Depending on the particular year, no CCX member can be consid-
ered to be out of compliance by more than 3 to 7%. Any non-
compliance above those values would be ignored by the CCX, limit-
32. Furthermore, CCX members must satisfy minimum financial requirements,
assuring a minimum degree of financial liquidity of the Exchange members. See
Eligible Commercial Entity Questionnaire, Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX)
Application for Membership 6-7, rev. 8/04/05 v4.
33. Chicago Climate Exch., Inc., 2004 Final Compliance Report as of Sept.
13, 2005, available at http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/environment/2004finalCo
mplianceReports.html.
34. See, e.g., Goodell, supra note 27 (discussing questions of offset additional-
ity and integrity of trading programs).
35. CCX Rulebook supra note 8, at Rule 4.8.
36. Id. Similar types of limitations and special exemptions apply to forest
product companies and electric energy producers. Id. at Rules 4.8 & 4.9.
279
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ing the compliance pressure once non-compliance has crossed a cer-
tain threshold.
There are additional, less-readily addressable problems. If private
trading arrangements become more widespread, membership will
inevitably grow to include companies whose voluntary commitment
to addressing global climate change may be much less serious than
that of current CCX members. There is also no assurance that car-
bon prices will always stay low. To prevent opportunism, bad faith,
or other forms of deliberate non-compliance, the necessity for a
credible and effective set of non-compliance sanctions would be-
come much more important. In such circumstances, would the CCX
compliance provisions provide adequate deterrence? The CCX's
present structure suggests that they might not for two reasons: 1)
lack of sufficient coerciveness, and 2) lack of sufficient certainty. 37
With respect to sanctions sufficiency, no information is available
about the range of fines that have been imposed, if any, nor of any
other consequences. Thus, it is unclear whether the compliance
mechanisms will be sufficient to induce compliance by businesses
that care little about the environment or their environmental image.
The operational success of the CCX also provides little guidance to
future behavior of current members if conditions were to change
significantly. For example, with carbon credit prices relatively low,
the price of "true-up" through allowance purchase has been low. If
carbon prices and compliance costs rise significantly, will the com-
mitment of CCX members to their green image still provide suffi-
cient pressure to comply with the limits? As the collapse of large
corporations like WorldCom and Enron and well-respected account-
ing firms like Arthur Anderson indicate, public opinion and the mar-
ketplace cannot always be relied upon to assure good behavior and
corporate integrity.
If non-compliance is to be expected under certain circumstances,
can the CCX itself be expected to properly police its members in all
relevant situations? The question goes to the issue of sanctions cer-
tainty. The CCX Rulebook allows for non-compliance sanctions
ranging from fines and suspension of trading privileges to expulsion.
Arguably, the CCX has an institutional interest in preventing com-
pliance failures and maintaining the integrity of the market. Failure
37. See generally Tseming Yang, International Treaty Enforcement as a Pub-
lic Good: The Role of Institutional Deterrent Sanctions in International Environ-
mental Agreements, MICH. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2006).
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to respond to significant instances of non-compliance could attract
attention by regulators and deplete its goodwill and environmental
reputation. The practical consequence would also be to lessen the
utility of Exchange participation to members interested in promoting
their green image.
But it is questionable how readily such sanctions, especially severe
ones, can be deployed. For example, it is not clear how the most
severe sanction, expulsion from the CCX, is always a credible deter-
rent. If carbon credit prices rise to such high levels that non-
compliance with true-up becomes attractive, would CCX member-
ship still be desirable? Arguably, under such circumstance, expul-
sion might not be viewed as punitive in nature. More importantly,
even if other punitive sanctions remain available, for example sig-
nificant monetary fines, would the CCX actually exercise that au-
thority?
Like other stock exchanges, the CCX is governed in large part by
its members. CCX members might be reluctant to support the impo-
sition of harsh sanctions, even if appropriate, lest they be on the re-
ceiving end of such sanctions one day. Furthermore, imposition of
harsh punitive sanctions could trigger resignations from the Ex-
change and deter new members from joining. If a significant num-
ber of members chose to leave the CCX, the continued viability of a
voluntary carbon market would be in jeopardy. In other words,
there is the very real possibility that considerations of individual
self-interest and the institutional interest of the CCX in its continued
existence could lead to inconsistent or less than full application of
CCX enforcement authority.
Can the CCX overcome potential enforcement difficulties? Some
of them could be circumvented through private (member-initiated)
judicial or arbitral enforcement actions. For example, an environ-
mental organization that joined the CCX primarily to retire carbon
allowance would ordinarily not be subject to the conflicting consid-
erations of self-interest that can impede private enforcement efforts.
Unfortunately, no CCX Rule Book provisions address such a possi-
bility. Rather, the Rule Book presumes that Exchange rule viola-
tions will primarily, maybe even exclusively, be dealt with by the
CCX itself.38 The Rule Book also does not specify whether lack of
transactional privity would be a bar to such actions.
38. CCX Rulebook supra note 8, at Rule 2.10 Exchange Rule Violations (set-
ting out investigation and resolution process for an alleged violation by CCX);
HeinOnline  -- 17 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 281 2005-2006
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If the Rulebook allowed such actions, it is unclear what the meas-
ure of damages would be. The reduced value of carbon allowances
due to the defendant's failure to true-up or otherwise comply with
Exchange requirements may be one answer. But would it be enough
to encourage private enforcement actions?
These problems must be resolved in order for a private market to
be a credible regulatory arrangement. Otherwise, the CCX will re-
main dependent on the good-will and voluntary commitment of its
participants, little more significant as a curiosity and experiment than
a true model for effective carbon markets.
39
III. THE NORTHEAST REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE
The other alternative to federal regulation is the creation of carbon
markets by the states. The most significant effort in this regard is
arguably the Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative - RGGI.
The RGGI is currently made up of 7 states: Connecticut, Delaware,
Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont.
Massachusetts and Rhode Island, originally part of the group, backed
out at the last minute.
The RGGI's overall purpose is to implement a "regional C02
emissions budget and allowance trading program that will regulate
C02 emissions from fossil-fuel-fired electricity generating units
having a rated capacity equal to or greater than 25 megawatts.
40
The overall initial carbon budget of the RGGI, set to go into effect
on January 1, 2009, will be approximately 121 million tons of car-
bon.41 Overall carbon emissions are to be reduced by 10% by 2018.
Rule 2.12 Application of Rules and Jurisdiction (Exchange participants are "sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Exchange with respect to any and all matters arising
from, related to, or in connection with, the status, actions or omissions"); Rule
2.14 Dispute Resolution (requiring arbitration of disputes regarding operation of
the Exchange at the discretion of the CCX); Rule 5.5 CCX Terms and Conditions
to Govern All Transactions ("Every transaction entered into by a CCX Registry
Account Holder is governed by the provisions contained in this Rulebook."); Rule
4.4 Nature of Transfers in CCX.
39. Goodell, supra note 27, at 34.
40. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Memorandum of Understanding 2
(Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_12_20_05.pdf [here-
inafter RGGI MOU].
41. Id. at 2-3.
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Each member state will have its own individual state-wide carbon
dioxide emissions cap.42
The RGGI is very much a work-in-progress. It is anticipated that
individual power plants will be given carbon allowances and will be
able to trade allowances among all RGGI states. 43 The RGGI pro-
poses the creation of a non-profit corporate entity, aptly dubbed the
"Regional Organization" to provide administrative support and su-
pervision. 44 The Regional Organization is expected to provide tech-
nical assistance services, function as a deliberative forum, track
emissions and allowances, and develop and implement offsets. It
will, however, have "no regulatory or enforcement authority with
respect to the Program.,
45
The integrity of carbon allowance trading is to be ensured by state
reciprocity provisions that allow for recognition of allowances gen-
erated in member states and by functionally equivalent state regula-
tory schemes that will guarantee the fungibility of carbon allowances
among the program states. Actual coordination of the RGGI imple-
mentation policies and operational rules to ensure such equivalence
is primarily accomplished by the promulgation of a Model Rule
which is to "serve as the framework for the creation of necessary
and/or regulatory authority to establish the [C02 trading] Program"
in each state.46
The draft Model Rule was released on March 23, 2006 for public
comment. It includes provisions addressing monitoring of the car-
bon emissions limits of individual power plants, including the poten-47
tial penalties for emissions in excess of carbon allowances. Thus,
the RGGI overcomes some of the carbon cap enforcement problems
by involving state regulatory authorities. Each state is committed to
exercising or gaining the necessary regulatory authority to monitor
and enforce non-compliance of individual power plant emissions
limits. 48
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 7.
45. Id. at 7-8.
46. Id. at 6-7.
47. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Public Review Model Rule Draft, art.
XX-6.5 (2006) available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/model-ruleredline_8 15
06.pdf.
48. RGGI MOU supra note 40 at 6-7.
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The draft Model Rule, however, does not address the question of
how the overall carbon emissions cap is to be maintained, should one
of the member states fail to achieve its state-wide emissions limit.
As a result, the RGGI creates no enforcement powers with respect to
the overall regional carbon budget, the regional cap.
Like the CCX, the RGGI contains an escape valve in anticipation
of one cause of non-compliance: the rise of the cost of carbon cred-
its to higher than expected levels. If carbon allowance prices exceed
$7/ton, the RGGI expects to liberalize the use of offset credits. 49
However, if carbon prices were to continue rising regardless of such
measures, the possibility of non-compliance might become signifi-
cant.
Lack of enforceability was built-in by design since a binding
multi-state cooperative agreement might require Compact Clause
approval by Congress.50 It is still uncertain whether the RGGI has
successfully evaded that requirement. Under the U.S. Supreme
Court's interpretation, only inter-state agreements that increase the
"political power or influence" of a state and thus encroach on the
"full and free exercise of the Federal authority" are subject to the
Compact Clause. 51 The Court's explanation in U. S. Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Comm'n, states that the "relevant inquiry must be one
of impact on our federal structure," indicating that the Compact
Clause reaches agreements that are "formal as well as ...infor-
mal." 5
2
For example, in Northeast Bancorp v. Bd of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 53 the Court found a New England multi-state agree-
ment regarding regional banking to fall outside of the scope of the
Compact Clause. The agreement in that case contained reciprocity
provisions and imposed regional limitations, but lacked a joint body
with regulatory authority. It also maintained state legislative author-
ity to unilaterally withdraw or otherwise legislatively modify any of
49. Id. at 5-6.
50. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("no state shall, without Consent of Congress,
.. enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State").
51. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893) ("The compact or agree-
ment will then be within the prohibition of the Constitution or without it, accord-
ing as the establishment of the boundary line may lead or not to the increase of the
political power or influence of the States affected, and thus encroach or not upon
the full and free exercise of Federal authority.").
52. 434 U.S. 452, 470-71 (1978).
53. 472 U.S. 159, 175-76 (1985).
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the regional requirements. 54 As a result, the Court found no increase
in the states' power vis-A-vis the federal government. 55 RGGI seems
to seek cover under the Northeast Bancorp analysis by providing the
Regional Organization no regulatory authorityr and relying on the
reciprocity provisions of the draft Model Rule.
However, the RGGI's carbon emission trading scheme is also dif-
ferent from the regional banking arrangement approved of by the
Supreme Court. Since the Bush Administration has rejected the
Kyoto Protocol and declared itself powerless to regulate carbon di-
oxide pursuant to the Fabricant memorandum, 57 the federal govern-
ment has essentially rejected any federal effort to limit carbon emis-
sions by government regulation. The RGGI's effort could be seen as
an end-run around that federal government policy. Rather than con-
stituting an effort to fill in a regulatory gap left by the Clean Air Act,
the RGGI could be interpreted by emissions limits opponents as an
attempt to defy federal government policy. Put differently, the
RGGI might be seen as an attempt to extend the regulatory reach of
individual states beyond commerce and markets bounded by their
individual state jurisdictional boundaries to a regional market that
encompasses the territories of the member states as a whole. In ef-
fect, regardless of state environmental officials' attempts to structure
the organization, the RGGI could be viewed as a potential usurpation
of the federal government's power to leave carbon emissions un-
regulated on a scale beyond the individual state level and subject to
the forces of national and regional markets.
Regardless of the ultimate merits of the Compact Clause issue, the
present structure of the RGGI leaves compliance with individual
state-wide emissions targets only to political accountability. The
political process, rather than any legal compulsion is the ultimate
sanctions process. Even though compliance by individual power
plants will be subject to control by state regulators, thereby avoiding
the difficulties of maintaining state-wide emission caps, defection
54. Id. at 175.
55. "In view of the Douglas Amendment to the BHCA, the challenged state
statutes which comply with that Act cannot possibly infringe federal supremacy...
• We do not see how the statutes in question either enhance the political power of
the New England States at the expense of other States or have an "impact on our
federal structure." Id. at 176.
56. See, e.g., U.S. Steal Corp., 434 U.S. at 472 (showing that the creation of a
multi-state administrative body, such as the Regional Organization, has been
found permissible by the U.S. Supreme Court).
57. See Fabricant, supra note 2.
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from the RGGI by any of the most significant member states (for
example, New York) is likely to influence (and degrade) the political
viability of carbon regulatory schemes in the other states. In fact, if
compliance with state-wide carbon limits were to become a drag on
the economy or a state's electorate brought significantly less envi-
ronmentally committed individuals to political leadership office, it is
questionable whether the political will to participate in the RGGI
could be maintained.
IV. PROMOTING OTHER TYPES OF MARKETS TO CONTROL
GREENHOUSE GASES
These efforts raise one more general thought: most of the efforts
of states have focused on the development of stand-alone carbon
trading programs. However, there are other market-promoting
measures that states can take short of creating a sui generis emission
trading regime. For example, states could provide broader regula-
tory support for existing private carbon markets such as the CCX.
One could imagine state governments strengthening or increasing
public oversight of private carbon exchanges.
Alternatively, states could also strengthen the hand of the compa-
nies who are trying to cultivate a positive environmental image and
reputation as a business asset or competitive advantage. States could
help to make a green reputation more valuable and meaningful by
policing misuse or unfair use, including its use to deceive or mislead
consumers. Such efforts would be little different from the regulation
of the organic food label, which has spawned a lucrative industry
and other environmentally conscious labeling and consumption hab-
its.
V. CONCLUSION
The attraction of markets for reducing pollution is great. The ab-
sence of the federal government in regulating carbon markets, how-
ever, makes their effective implementation difficult. That does not
make carbon markets, including cap and trade programs, infeasible.
It does, however, create obstacles to the effective maintenance of
overall emissions cap. In the end, without deliberate design efforts
focused on ensuring environmental efficacy, such trading schemes
will likely be more tools for entrepreneurial individuals to take ad-
vantage of business and political opportunities than to solve the
problem of global climate change.
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